Pierangelo bertolli certi momentive bankruptcy

gift certificate birthday gift gift idea wine gift basket christmas gift personalized gift gift for him gift box. 投稿者 Marina: 年11月02日 Create an account or log into Facebook. Connect with friends, family and other people you know. Share photos and videos, send messages and get updates. Pierangelo Bertoli (November 5, – October 7, ) was an Italian singer-songwriter and poet. Close to libertarian communist issues his works told mainly about environment, laïcité, antimilitarism and social issues regarding marginalized and rebellious October 7, (aged 59), Modena.

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They seriously misread the seriousness of the situation and the wave of public indignation and protest that was about to engulf them. These adjustments could be realized only through raising taxation, which would be unpop- ular, and reducing public expenditure, which would undermine the parties' power base. Failing to qualify, and thus relegating Italy to Europe's 'slow lane', was not a feasible option in a country so enthusiastic about European integration.

In this way, the single currency exploded the contradiction that had been at the heart of Italy's 'flawed Euro- peanism' throughout the post-war period. Its long-term enthusiastic pro-European stance had been consistently contradicted by the country's concomitant failure to bring its political and economic structures up to the European average as well as its failure to play a more productive role at the European policy-making level itself. This con- tradiction was a product of the blocked nature of the political system.

Paradoxically, it was precisely the impact of European integration that assisted in ending the anom- alies of the political system, and allowed Italy's 'flawed Europeanism' to begin to be overcome. Third, the judiciary began to uncover the pervasive corruption present in the system, and public prosecutors were given encouragement by the changed domestic and inter- national situation to pursue this ever more vehemently see chapter 8. For them, the end of the Cold War meant that the governing parties could be thoroughly investigated without the prospect, if toppled, of bringing to power an anti-system party.

The results of the April elections significantly denting the governing parties' electoral strengths and the prominence and support given to the anti-corruption campaign rein- forced the judiciary's determination, and also made it more difficult for politicians to employ their usual practices of insabbiatnento 'covering up' in relation to 'incon- venient' investigations. Finally, small and large entrepreneurs proved willing to confess, volunteering detailed information about their bribe taking and the politicians involved Newell b: Fourth, the long-term high levels of popular dissatisfaction with Italian democracy were finally translated into a serious protest against the regime Morlino and Tarchi Previously, this dissatisfaction had been kept in check by the presence of 'constraining factors' the regime's anti-fascism and the anti-Communist role of the DC.

The declining efficacy of these factors was evidenced in the emergence of new parties and protest movements notably the Northern League and the referendum movement, which secured the abolition of preference voting in Subsequently, several 'incentives' for protest also emerged: the economic crisis of the early s and exit of the lira from the ERM; the exposure of corruption by the magistrates; the reform of the electoral system; and the murder of the anti-Mafia judges Falcone and Borsellino.

What followed was nothing short of dramatic. In the period between the April and March elections, nearly all of the main political parties suffered organiza- tional and electoral collapse the PCI and the MSI surviving through changing their names , and the political class was decimated.

New and in some cases recycled politi- cians, parties and alliances came on to the scene see chapter 3. A decade of political change has followed, which has been gradually reshaping the Italian polity. The sheer drama of what hap- pened in the early s, with the focus on politicians and political parties and the key role they played in the First Republic, gave the impression that a veritable revo- lution or palace coup was taking place Gilbert This tended to direct attention towards the collapse of the political parties as constituting the essential motivating factor for the changes across the Italian polity that occurred subsequently and are still occurring.

Yet, while it is undeniable that the transformation in the parties constituted an important cause of changes that subsequently took place Newell b: chs , it is also clear, as the above analysis suggests, that their collapse was, at the same time, a consequence of deeper changes at work in the Italian polity Bull c.

The dra- matic changes in party politics, therefore, should be seen less as the beginning of a process of fundamental change across the system, than as the first and most dramatic moment of change, as a consequence of long-term international and domestic pres- sures being exerted on the old order.

The subsequent party transformation acted as a catalyst and prism for those changes, as well as causing other changes to occur. The long-term pressures, moreover, did not disappear once the parties had collapsed. As noted above, one can, broadly speaking, identify two 'fault lines' running through the current Italian system: the ramifications of the end of the Cold War and the demands of European and international economic integration.

The collapse of the parties in the early s, while putting an end to some key aspects of the old regime, did not automatically reform the system in such a way as to enable it to cope better with these pressures. Rather, the collapse and reconfiguration of the parties provided the potential for this, by ending the monopoly of power of the old governing parties and, it was hoped, making way for the establishment of a new political class com- mitted to reform. In other words, if there was a palace coup in the s, it involved the removal of specific politicians and parties, not politicians and parties per se.

It is difficult to conceive of liberal democracy without political parties, and there was never such a prospect in Italy even though, at the height of the crisis, the parties were not capable of sustaining party government, and the President had to resort to appointing 'technocratic' governments. Consequently, once the 'party political sphere' began to reformulate and reassert itself, it began inevitably to claw back its control over reform and the management of change.

This tendency was reinforced by the easing but not ending of economic pressures once it was known that Italy had qualified for the single currency. However, since the parties had been victims and not vehicles of the changes that occurred in the early s, it was far from inevitable that the reassertion of the party political sphere would produce a reform of the system. The failure to achieve such a reform - or at least the failure of the changes that have occurred to meet the expectations generated by the revolution in party politics - can be explained by four factors.

Political Change in Post- War Italy 1 7 First, the party-political arena itself remains in some turmoil see chapter 3. While the revolution in party politics ended the old party system and produced electoral reform, this did not automatically produce a new, stabilized party system. There has been a slow process of bipolarization, but the contours of the party system are still prone to considerable change.

Second, in this unstable situation, the party political sphere has none the less estab- lished its own dynamic, and political parties their own autonomy, with party strate- gies, as in the past, quickly focusing on party-political interests. Party competition has become embroiled in new issues that have caused deep divisions over questions of reform. This is not to suggest that parties are inherently against reform, but rather that the pressures to agree on reform produced by the sense of crisis and urgency of the early s have long passed.

As long as coalitions remain essential to achieve change, the parties can often act as veto players in relation to reforms that are not seen to be in their interests.

Third, this tendency is reinforced by the fact that the party-political sphere is not, of course, autonomous of broader economic and social interests, and in various quar- ters there is still stiff resistance to many of the changes often identified as necessary to open up Italian capitalism see chapter The lobby of politicians, bureaucrats, state holdings managers, financial institutions and trade unionists against the privatization and liberalization of the Italian capitalist model remains strong.

Fourth, the dramatic changes of the early s produced a new dominant political party Forza Italia and politician Silvio Berlusconi , yet whether their putative com- mitment to reforming the political system is genuine remains open to question. Berlus- coni could be viewed as a quintessential product of the First Republic, and someone who launched his political career to try to protect his own personal interests.

Despite his polit- ical rhetoric of reform, he has brought to the heart of Italian government a conflict of interests which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. This is between his position as Prime Minister and his control of 90 per cent of private television networks, which currently secure 43 per cent of the total average of television viewers.

The fact that Berlusconi has been the main political beneficiary of the collapse of the First Republic has had a direct bearing on the reform debate in two interrelated ways. The first is that policy reforms in several sectors have been subject to fierce oppo- sition at the parliamentary and societal levels because they appear to have been for- mulated with the Prime Minister's judicial and commercial interests in mind.

This concern applies particularly to institutional or constitutional reform. There is a growing body of opinion in Italy echoed in the respectable press abroad that regards the Prime Minister's increasing concentration of media, economic and political power as alarming, and possibly tantamount to the construction of a new 'regime' e. Sartori ; Santomassimo ; Ginsborg Under his second government elected in , there has been a strengthening of policy direction, as a consequence of the presence of a clear albeit often divided governing majority, and a strengthening of control over resources of patronage.

The dangers of the first are evi- denced in the controversial nature of many of the policies, deriving from Berlusconi's peculiar position. The dangers of the second arise from the fact that lottizzazione inevitably works differently in a bipolarized system with a clear division between a majority and an opposition that expect to alternate in power.

Patronage is more likely to become part of strengthening the government against an expected alternation. The government's passing of the Frattini Law which allows the replacement of a large number of officials by an incoming government and its actions in relation to appoint- ments to RAI, ENI, ENEL, Finmeccanica and the postal services give an idea of the perceived importance of this power to the government Donovan The above scenario has produced a complex situation, in which the pace and scope of reform vary across different sectors, but which overall is probably less than what was popularly expected by the revolution in party politics at the beginning of the s.

This is perhaps best reflected in the steep decline in the number of Italians of all political persuasions declaring themselves to be satisfied with the functioning of Italian democracy - from what were relatively low levels in the first place see table 1. The pressures being exerted on the Italian system are still present, and the Italian polity continues to undergo change, but the direction and outcome of that change are Political Change in Post- War Italy 1 9 not clear.

Change is mediated through a new party-pohtical 'prism' that has the capac- ity to retard as much as to accelerate. This helps to explain why the Italian polity is currently characterized by areas of both dynamism and stagnation, with some sectors adjusting much more quickly to new challenges than others. The most ardent reform- ers view a constitutional revision as ultimately necessary to 'normalize' the political system; but, as noted, this is, in fact, one of the areas of most notable division and stagnation.

To conclude, in the broader political system i. These include the parties organ- izations, alliances, party system ; institutions e. The reforms are neither clear-cut nor complete. Several are subject to resistance, where they have not stalled altogether. Yet, whatever the caveats, it remains true that most of the reforms were largely unimaginable before the early s. In this sense, irrespective of the constitutional order and the stagnation of reform in some sectors, we are witnessing the gradual passing of the former Italian political model and the emergence of a new one, whose key contours and characteristics remain to be shaped.

It is to a more detailed treatment of the economic context of that model that we now turn. The Post- War Economy and Macro-Economic Policy Making Introduction In the post-war period Italy became integrated into a new international economic system dominated by the United States, later influenced by moves towards European integration.

As a consequence, the Italian economy has experienced problems and pat- terns of development that are not dissimilar to those of many other West European economies across the decades. At the same time, there have been distinctive national traits to the Italian economy that have made it stand out from other economies in the West, and which have had a significant impact on its performance.

These traits concern structural and territorial distortions, the nature of macro-economic policy, and regu- lation of the economy generally. This chapter which adopts a historical approach to macro-economic policy making and chapters 10 and 11 which adopt a thematic approach to the economy's structural and territorial features will emphasize the dis- tinctiveness of the post-war economic model and its mode of state regulation, as well as analysing how this has begun to change in the period since the early s.

From post-war reconstruction to the end of the economic miracle At the end of the war, the Italian economy had low levels of industrialization, territo- rial and structural dualisms, high levels of unemployment and underemployment, inequalities in salaries and wealth, little advanced technology, and an absence of basic raw materials. The economy was also relatively closed and protected from the inter- national economic environment.

Its poor comparative wealth is perhaps best exem- plified in per capita income which, in , was only a quarter of that of the United States and little more than half that of most of the countries of northern Europe. Despite twenty-two years of fascism, Italy remained a largely agricultural society, with The Post- War Economy 21 This situation began to change in the s, partly as a result of fundamental deci- sions made in the period of reconstruction.

The late s were characterized by a reassertion of the forces of economic liberalism, which involved two changes. First, at the domestic level, it meant reducing state intervention and giving freedom to market forces in contrast with moves towards Keynesianism in Britain and France.

Second, at the external level, it involved reducing protectionist controls and opening the economy to world competition. The parties of the left, which might have chosen an alternative course, were gradually marginalized from political influ- ence, and the line of De Gasperi Prime Minister and Einaudi Governor of the Bank of Italy, then Minister of the Budget and, in , President of the Republic prevailed.

Nevertheless, the commitment to liberalization was not unequivocal. There were several influential economists such as Sylos Labini, Bertolini, Fua and politicians Fanfani and the dossettiani, who would become the most influential faction in the DC who were less disposed towards a withdrawal of the State. The Fascist inheri- tance included a wide-ranging network of state holdings, not all of which was dis- mantled: the large state holdings, IRI hydrocarbons and AGIP petrol , for example, were left intact.

It was also apparent that some forms of state intervention would be necessary to carry out the tasks of reconstruction, specifically in public housing, public works particularly major roads , agriculture and the south Salvati In short, while this period was marked by a rejection of pure Keynesianism the Keyne- sian Piano del lavoro or 'Plan for work' proposed by the trade unions was hardly even considered by the government , this did not entail a complete abandonment of state intervention.

The economic conditions, in fact, became conducive to the development of more extensive forms of state regulation, which would take on a peculiarly Italian character. The s and beyond were marked by stability and high levels of economic growth, and were quickly dubbed an 'economic miracle'.

Figures for three successive periods , and give some idea of the extent of the achievement. The most impressive period was , when 'the Italian economy managed to realise three main achievements, seldom to be found simultaneously present in the same country: namely, a high rate of growth and capital accumulation, price stability, and balance of payments equilibrium' Graziani In fact, the figures confirm that strong economic growth continued through two decades see table 2.

In addition, inflation during the period was low approximately 3. Unemployment was the one exception to this achievement: it averaged 5. Italy's 'economic miracle' has been cited as a classic example of export-led growth Stern ; Graziani , The contribution of government was not crucial, since little beyond fine-tuning was necessary.

Rather, the 'miracle' is explained by several other factors. Because of relatively low internal demand albeit boosted by public expenditure in the south , Italian companies were forced to look abroad to sell their products, and they found them to be very competitive.

Labour was available at low wage rates and was replenished by the exodus from agriculture and migration from the south, which also kept trade unions weak. The influx of new technology from the United States modernized what were particularly backward industrial structures, and this, combined with Einaudi's strict monetary policy, forced the industrial system to rationalize, boosting productivity along capital-intensive lines.

Finally, there was a decline in the price of raw materials from abroad, notably oil. Yet, if this was a success story, it was one that carried with it 'distortions' and imbal- ances, which to some extent were exacerbated by the rapidity of economic growth Lutz ; Graziani , , First, the structural dualism persisted between a few capital-intensive giant corporations, on the one hand, and small, family-run firms, on the other.

This was heightened by the opening up of the economy, since those sectors that were forced to seek overseas markets became more highly productive and dynamic, leaving other sectors to stagnate Graziani Second, the economy's ter- ritorial dualism between north and south was exacerbated. The dynamism of the large corporations of the industrial north, coupled with the massive exodus of labour from the south, left the southern economy underdeveloped, despite the beginnings of state aid to the south in Third, the agricultural sector remained backward.

Despite agricultural reform in the s, agriculture had an average growth rate 2. Fourth, the competitiveness of Italian industry was based largely on low labour costs rather than technological investment. Indeed, despite the injection of new tech- nologies, levels of technological innovation remained lower than in most of Italy's main competitors, particularly in the large number of family-run firms. Fifth, there were high levels of unemployment, notably in the sectors of low productivity.

Sixth, the exodus from the south towards the industrial triangle of the north placed rising demands on local governments there for services in health, education, housing, public transport of a quality which they proved unable to provide. These economic distortions were compounded by the specific approach of the new political class to state intervention. State intervention was considerably expanded from The Post-War Economy 23 the s onwards, for three reasons: the underdevelopment of the south; a decision taken to develop heavy industry e.

However, due to the hostile ideological climate of the s and the fragility of the DCs social base, this expansion was exploited for more subtle purposes too. Swept to power on a wide inter-class base, but confronted with a strong delegitimized Communist party, the DC found itself confronted with something of a dilemma.

If the party pursued reformist policies, it risked its support amongst the more traditional sectors hence the plummet in its electoral support in the south in the local elections after the agrarian reform.

Yet, if the party failed to introduce reforms, it would undermine its support amongst more progressive sectors, at the same time giving legitimacy to several of the PCI's demands. The DCs dilemma, then, was a reflection of the dualism existing in the economy. In , the DCs new party leader, Amintore Fanfani, saw it as imperative that the DC transform itself from what was largely a party of notables into a modern mass party with a strong organization, capable of mobilizing different sectors of the elec- torate.

Whatever the policy's original objectives, modernization of the party became, over time, intimately linked to 'colonization' of the state sector of the economy. This allowed the DC to begin to use the new forms of state intervention to tie sectors of society to the party, particularly in the south. It enabled the party to preserve its inter- class base while, at the same time, making itself less dependent on the more traditional elements of southern politics.

The policy also kept the south underdeveloped and depopulating, thereby hindering the development of class conflict. Salvati 1 described this situation as one of 'repressive development', or rapid eco- nomic growth 'underpinned by under-development'.

Italian capitalism, he suggested, was therefore characterized by 'precocious maturity', a situation which was inherently unstable. Not surprisingly, therefore, once the factors facilitating growth began to dis- appear in the s, the underlying problems of the economy surfaced, exposing the political class's failure to facilitate a stable political-economic equilibrium for long-term growth.

In this way, the unfolding of several factors culminated in the explosion of social and worker militancy at the end of the decade, known as the 'hot autumn'. First, despite reasonable rates of growth in the s, the 'virtuous cycle' was arrested in the early part of the decade. Price and wage inflationary tendencies sur- faced in , which were largely a product of growing wage demands as employment reached peak levels in the north. Inflation rose from 2. This deflationary policy affected business investment and profits, which could be maintained only through a rationalization of existing capacity, essentially through longer working hours.

Conse- quently, the annual growth rate in this period 5. Second, there was an increase in international competition, which made it difficult for companies to maintain profits by raising prices. Exports continued to expand until , but this year represented a peak, and Italian companies experienced increasing difficulties in the s in trying to expand their export markets.

Export growth had 24 The Post-War Economy occurred primarily in what were originally high-technology sectors e. As these sectors became more standardized, they were prone to competition from less developed countries with cheaper labour.

At the same time foreign companies had begun to compete more effectively in the Italian domestic market, resulting in an increase in imports. Third, the trade unions and workforce increased their industrial and political muscle, partly due to the move towards full employment in the north, making it more difficult to sustain profits on low wages, and partly because of poor working conditions.

There was a growing sense amongst the labour force that it had not enjoyed the fruits of the economic growth of the previous decade. Moreover, the tighter labour markets in the north highlighted the economy's territorial dualism, since there were large reserves of labour 'locked up' in low-productivity areas.

Early in the decade, there was hope that the government's management of the economy would be conducive to a resolution of these problems, since the centrist gov- erning coalitions of the s - DC, Liberals PLI , Republicans PRI and Social Democrats PSDI - were replaced with the centre left formula.

For the more progressive elements of the political class, the new political formula, combined with economic planning, was the means whereby the economy's structural distortions could be removed, at the same time as integrating an important part of the working class into the capitalist system.

The main priorities of 'The National Economic Plan for the Five Years ' were to boost employment in specified areas, modernize and increase agricultural production, reduce the north-south divide, provide better social infrastructures and reform the State Valli Italian capitalism, it was argued, would be rationalized and stabilized, thus moving it closer to the European model.

However, the centre left was opposed at both ends of the political spectrum. On the one hand, it brought out fully the interests of the more backward-looking sectors of Italian capitalism notably the right wing of the DC , which stood to lose from pro- gressive reform.

On the other hand, there were elements of the left in the PSI, PCI and trade union movement who interpreted the centre left experiment as a neo-capitalist plan designed to rationalize Italian capitalism's primary contradictions and split the working class in the process which in fact occurred. The strength of opposition par- ticularly from the right was sufficient to impede the approval of several reforms, and the plan of failed almost totally with regard to its major objectives.

Unem- ployment increased in the south, the state of agriculture and the north-south divide worsened, social infrastructures in northern cities were hardly improved, and reform of the State was faltering and partial Valli The PSI, rather than becom- ing the agent of radical change by entering the stanza dei bottom 'control room' , began to cultivate the practices of the existing governing parties, bent on securing its electoral future through the distribution of patronage.

This had the effect of widening the constituencies in need of attention, thus distorting further the distribution of public resources in the system. This explains why the disastrous experience of economic plan- ning, coupled with a struggling private sector, was not compensated by the perform- ance of the state holdings system. Paradoxi- cally, this evolution was occurring at a time when the state holdings system was regarded as a model of good industrial performance, widely admired abroad.

The credibility of the centre left experiment effectively collapsed after the elec- tions. Workers, lacking the benefits they might have expected from the 'economic miracle', became, by the late s, an entrenched and unaccommodating group ready to use its industrial muscle.

From THE hot autumn to the crisis of the First Repubuc The hot autumn embodied a radical change in the power of industrial workers see chapter 5. The trade unions used the spontaneous wave of strikes and militant action in to achieve several important changes: large wage increases up to 15 per cent ; the abolition of differences in wage scales; increased security of employment; a new pension law providing two-thirds of a worker's final wage at the age of 60 with some indexing for inflation ; a housing law which provided for an increase in the stock of public housing ; the right to hours of paid education or training each year; and an increase in investment in the south.

The government's concession to these demands was coupled with a deflationary policy designed - as a decade previously - to weaken the labour market and under- mine wage and other demands.

Yet, while this had the effect of depressing economic activity, it failed to prevent the intense wage push of the first half of the s, which was common across Western Europe, but particularly acute in Italy, for three reasons. First, a shift had occurred in the internal balance of power in the trade union move- ment towards both the plant level and specific industrial unions such as the Metal- workers that were less willing to compromise than most others.

Second, Confindustria, representing business interests, was divided in its response. Small and medium-sized businesses wished to resist wage demands, while large-scale industry was open to bargaining with the trade unions.

Meetings between the two sides held in , however, proved to be failures. Third, the government lacked the cohesion and ability to carry through a deflationary strategy, largely because of the exhaustion of the centre left formula Salvati On the back of this failure, the PSI would only sanction the re- creation of the centre left if several trade union demands and parts of the centre left programme were acted upon. The DC was in too weak a position to resist these con- ditions, given that its coalition alternatives would have had to involve either the PCI or parties of the right the monarchists and neo-fascists , and given the pressures being exerted by its own trade union, the CISL.

The elections, moreover, which marked a shift to the right in the electorate and the formation of a centre right government, did little to change things, as both unions and business were opposed to a tighter mon- etary policy.

Consequently, government economic policy succeeded in depressing economic activ- ity without resisting either higher wage demands or other increases in public expen- 26 The Post-War Economy Table 2. In addition, since productivity gains in the s had been achieved largely through a rationalization of existing capacity e.

Employers were also now less inclined to raise productivity through capital-intensive investment because of the increased security of employment - especially in a context of a general decline in world demand. The recovery of economic activity in the second half of enhanced the inflationary formula more growth, more inflation in the economy, and the rise in prices to achieve profits was matched by a rise in wages.

Finally, the decision taken, in February , to float the lira on the currency markets until then it had been based on fixed exchange rates led to its devaluation by approx- imately 15 per cent in a year.

This set in motion a devaluation-inflation-devaluation spiral that would endure throughout the decade. The fourfold increase in oil prices in October , therefore, had a severe impact on Italy, not just because of the country's high dependence on oil imports it had little coal, oil, gas and nuclear power, so over 80 per cent of its energy needs were met by imported oil at substantial cost , but because the economy, in contrast with its Euro- pean partners, was in a phase of 'inflationistic expansion'.

The world recession and high oil prices shattered the assumption of continued economic growth in Western economies and gave rise to a new phenomenon: stagflation the simultaneous rise of inflation and unemployment , combined with erratic growth. In Italy, stagflation was exacerbated by the emergence of an additional phenomenon that was to characterize the economy thereafter: a dramatic rise in the public sector deficit see table 2.

This was caused by prior spending commitments e. The Post-War Economy 27 Self-financing until then, this sector was now spiralling into debt. Industries such as steel and chemicals were, as elsewhere in Europe, suffering from world overproduc- tion; but the problems were particularly acute in Italy as a result of poor management party control and a series of poor investment decisions in the late s and early s.

IRI, for example, having broken even in , was billion lire in debt in , bilhon in , 1, billion in , and 2, billion by , a figure representing 6 per cent of GDP Balcet Proposed by Confindustria, the idea behind it was to reduce inflationary expectations in the economy, thus reducing shop-floor unrest, assisting a shift in power back to the trade union confederations with a subsequent moderation in wage demands at the same time as giving the government room to control price increases.

Yet, although shop-floor unrest was reduced, the agreement which marked a peak in trade union power had several other unforeseen consequences. First, because inflation was running at more than 20 per cent per annum, in any given year the proportion of a worker's pay increase deriving from the scala mobile soon far outweighed the proportion secured from collective bargaining.

This led to a 90 per cent rise in industrial labour costs between and By wage costs per unit of production were 39 per cent higher than in Germany or Britain.

Profits fell, many firms going bankrupt. The rise in labour costs, moreover, undermined the effec- tiveness of the government's price-control policy. Second, wage indexation increased unemployment, because high labour costs deterred employers from taking on new workers. The expansion in scope of the state insurance fund the Cassa integrazione guadagni , a trade union demand, by which workers would receive 80 per cent of their pay for a year if made redundant, made it easier for firms to release workers, the cost to be borne by the State.

Third, it led more and more firms to retreat from the 'offi- cial economy' because of high production costs. There was a 'decentralization' of pro- duction, with thousands of firms adopting techniques that avoided wage regulations, unions, social security contributions and taxes. Production costs were said to be up to a third cheaper than in a standard factory. The performance of this sector of small and medium-sized firms helped to maintain the comparatively good performance of the Italian economy, but it did little for the state coffers.

With social and economic tensions high, the PCI, in the national elections, reached its post-war electoral peak This saw the formation of 'national solidarity' governments supported by the PCI during Xvid Mp3. XviD-NovaRip [New release] nod32 5. Author: darblan [ Edit View ]. Subject: Sky Fall Torrent. Serial Manufacturing Workmanship. Author: schneelme [ Edit View ]. Who sanctions D. Pop MP4 Deluxe Edition. Cracked Live. Author: wynetpata [ Edit View ].

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