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John kenning comdisco bankruptcy

john kenning comdisco bankruptcy

Nov 26,  · On July 16, , Comdisco filed for bankruptcy. Roughly eleven months later, on June 13, , the parties filed the First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, which authorized the creation of the Litigation Trust and the appointment of a trustee. On July 15, , Exhibit C-2 (Distribution Agreement) to the Plan was karacto.xyzg: john kenning. Comdisco hired John "Jack" Butler Jr., co-leader of the worldwide restructuring practice at Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, as lead counsel on March 29, the company's bankruptcy filing shows. On July 26, , Comdisco filed for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Bank One subsequently filed a Master Proof of Claim for the outstanding loans to the SIP participants, claiming the principal sum of $,, as well as a claim on behalf of Dresdner Bank AG in the amount of $3,, plus interest and karacto.xyzg: john kenning.

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The Trust assets eventually included not only the subrogation rights, but also the notes. The trustee sought to enforce the notes against the Claimants, relying on their promise to repay the amounts borrowed to pay for the stock. They resisted and brought a motion in bankruptcy court to terminate the Trust, apparently on the theory that after the Trust terminates no one may collect on the notes and their liability would be extinguished. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, the district court affirmed, and the Claimants now appeal to this court.

We conclude, however, that we lack appellate jurisdiction because the district court's order does not meet even the flexible finality standard embodied in 28 U. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The chronology of events that led to the Trust, though undisputed, is important both to an understanding of the dispute between the parties and to our concern about appellate jurisdiction.

We therefore recount it briefly here. On July 16, , Comdisco filed for bankruptcy. Roughly eleven months later, on June 13, , the parties filed the First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, which authorized the creation of the Litigation Trust and the appointment of a trustee.

The bankruptcy court entered its order confirming the Plan on July 31, Once the Plan was confirmed, the Trust came into being. Its assets included "those assets to be transferred to and owned by the Litigation Trust. This is an adversary proceeding in which the trustee is attempting to collect funds for the Trust. The trustee takes the position that the Claimants who include all of the people who borrowed money to purchase the SIP stock and who signed the promissory notes must make good on the promissory notes they signed, despite the fact that the stock that Claimants bought with the borrowed money may now be worthless.

The Claimants do not want to pay up. They argue instead that the Trust should be terminated because it has fulfilled its main purpose, which they characterize as "pay[ing] the C-4 creditors," who are defined in the plan as the people holding "general unsecured claims against Comdisco.

Class C-5A includes those who have an allowed interest in Comdisco, while Class C-5B includes people with allowed subordinated claims against Comdisco.

Even though one of the stated purposes of the Trust is the liquidation of the Trust assets that is, reducing the notes to cash by forcing payment from the Claimants , the Claimants argue that the C-4 creditors have already received sufficient recovery.

The Claimants, it is worth noting at this juncture, have since been classified as C-5 creditors. Such an outcome, they conclude, is forbidden by both the Plan and the Bankruptcy Code.

The appellees point out that the Plan involved a compromise between the interests of the C-4 and the C-5 creditors. Ordinarily equity holders are at the back of the queue, and so they would not begin to collect until all creditors have been satisfied.

The Claimants then appealed to the district court. The district court found that the adjudication of the Claimants' Termination Motion was a core proceeding under 28 U. It held that because the bankruptcy judge's order disposed of a discrete dispute, it had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U. Although the difference between subparts a 1 and a 3 did not matter for the district court, it does for this court. Before we may reach the merits of this appeal, we must ensure that we have appellate jurisdiction.

We, however, cannot finesse the issue. No one doubts that the bankruptcy judge resolved one particular issue: the question whether the time has come to terminate the Trust because its purposes have been fulfilled.

But that is not what happened. Instead, by rejecting the termination motion, the bankruptcy court was allowing the Trust to continue and further disbursements to be made in accordance with its terms. Just as an order in a simple case between two parties that grants summary judgment on the whole case to one side is appealable under 28 U.

It is well established that the concept of finality for purposes of bankruptcy appeals is more flexible than the one that applies to ordinary appeals governed by 28 U.

Thus, the First Circuit observed that "Congress has long provided that orders in bankruptcy cases may be immediately appealed if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case. But what exactly is a "discrete dispute," and how does it differ from merely a "discrete issue" within a dispute? Saco offers some insight into the answer to that question.

It concluded that for purposes of the predecessor statute it was applying, 28 U. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, the district court affirmed, and the Claimants now appeal to this court.

We conclude, however, that we lack appellate jurisdiction because the district court's order does not meet even the flexible finality standard embodied in 28 U. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We therefore recount it briefly here. On July 16, , Comdisco filed for bankruptcy.

Roughly eleven months later, on June 13, , the parties filed the First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, which authorized the creation of the Litigation Trust and the appointment of a trustee. The bankruptcy court entered its order confirming the Plan on July 31, Once the Plan was confirmed, the Trust came into being. Its assets included "those assets to be transferred to and owned by the Litigation Trust. This is an adversary proceeding in which the trustee is attempting to collect funds for the Trust.

The trustee takes the position that the Claimants who include all of the people who borrowed money to purchase the SIP stock and who signed the promissory notes must make good on the promissory notes they signed, despite the fact that the stock that Claimants bought with the borrowed money may now be worthless. The Claimants do not want to pay up. They argue instead that the Trust should be terminated because it has fulfilled its main purpose, which they characterize as "pay[ing] the C-4 creditors," who are defined in the plan as the people holding "general unsecured claims against Comdisco.

Class C-5A includes those who have an allowed interest in Comdisco, while Class C-5B includes people with allowed subordinated claims against Comdisco. Even though one of the stated purposes of the Trust is the liquidation of the Trust assets that is, reducing the notes to cash by forcing payment from the Claimants , the Claimants argue that the C-4 creditors have already received sufficient recovery.

The Claimants, it is worth noting at this juncture, have since been classified as C-5 creditors. Such an outcome, they conclude, is forbidden by both the Plan and the Bankruptcy Code. The appellees point out that the Plan involved a compromise between the interests of the C-4 and the C-5 creditors. Ordinarily equity holders are at the back of the queue, and so they would not begin to collect until all creditors have been satisfied.

The Claimants then appealed to the district court. The district court found that the adjudication of the Claimants' Termination Motion was a core proceeding under 28 U. It held that because the bankruptcy judge's order disposed of a discrete dispute, it had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U. Although the difference between subparts a 1 and a 3 did not matter for the district court, it does for this court.

Before we may reach the merits of this appeal, we must ensure that we have appellate jurisdiction. We, however, cannot finesse the issue. No one doubts that the bankruptcy judge resolved one particular issue: the question whether the time has come to terminate the Trust because its purposes have been fulfilled.

But that is not what happened. Instead, by rejecting the termination motion, the bankruptcy court was allowing the Trust to continue and further disbursements to be made in accordance with its terms. Just as an order in a simple case between two parties that grants summary judgment on the whole case to one side is appealable under 28 U.

Thus, the First Circuit observed that "Congress has long provided that orders in bankruptcy cases may be immediately appealed if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case. But what exactly is a "discrete dispute," and how does it differ from merely a "discrete issue" within a dispute? Saco offers some insight into the answer to that question. It concluded that for purposes of the predecessor statute it was applying, 28 U.

This court offered a rule-of-thumb for deciding when a separable dispute exists in bankruptcy many years ago, in In re Morse Electric Co. Such a claim is far enough along to be intelligently resolved, without duplicative appellate review of the same creditor's situation. Accord, Zedan v. Habash, F. The final disposition of an adversary proceeding within a core proceeding thus falls within our jurisdiction.

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