Futter lumber corp bankruptcy

futter lumber corp bankruptcy

HYPNOTIC TAXI LLC, et al., Debtors. x. CITIBANK, N.A., Plaintiff, v. BOMBSHELL TAXI LLC, et al., Defendants. x. Chapter 7. Case No. (CEC) Adv. Pro. No.: (CEC). Futter Lumber Corp is located at Merrick Rd, Rockville Centre, NY. This business specializes in Lumber. Posted on August 28, Brought to you by merchantcircle. Futter Lumber Corporation can be found at Merrick Rd The following is offered: Industrial Importers. The entry is present with us since Sep 10, and was last updated on. Order Extending Automatic Stay Not Final; Mortgagor Denied Leave to Appeal Under §(c).

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A highly-regarded, venerable Orlando business law firm is seeking an experienced insurance defense attorney, ideally with some experience in As part of your digital membership, you can sign up for an unlimited number of a wide range of complimentary newsletters. Visit your My Account page to make your selections. Dismissal is appropriate only where the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts consistent with their complaint that would entitle them to relief.

Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods. However, conclusory statements are not a substitute for minimally sufficient factual allegations. Furlong v. Long Island Coll. Appellants' Sherman Act Section 1 claim, based on the Doman-Sherwood distribution agreement, fails because they have not alleged an injury to competition, an element of a prima facie Section 1 claim.

Section 1 prohibits " [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations. It has long been "recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.

Khan , U. A violation of Section 1 generally requires a combination or other form of concerted action between two legally distinct entities resulting in an unreasonable restraint on trade.

Geneva Pharms. Barr Labs. If a restraint alleged is among that small class of actions that courts have deemed to have "such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit," it will be unreasonable per se. State Oil , U. Most antitrust claims, however, are analyzed under a "rule of reason" analysis which seeks to determine if the alleged restraint is unreasonable because its "anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects.

USA Petroleum Co. The complaint alleges a vertical restraint between a supplier Doman and a distributor Sherwood. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States , U. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. But, critically, nothing in the complaint suggests that this agreement results in either a "predictable and pernicious" per se violation or "unreasonable" rule of reason violation effect on competition.

It is not "a violation of the antitrust laws, without a showing of actual adverse effect on competition market-wide, for a manufacturer to terminate a distributor. Appellants do not assert that Doman's market share is somehow an illegal monopoly and seek no relief on that ground. But, they allege, the exclusive distributorship with Sherwood further harms competition.

However, appellants' hypothesizing of an unreasonable effect on competition fails because such a vertical arrangement provides no monopolistic benefit to Doman that it does not already enjoy and would not continue to enjoy if the exclusive distributorship were enjoined. To put it another way, had Doman established its own in-house distribution system with the same monopoly that Sherwood is alleged to possess, there would have been no increase in the restriction of output of green hem-fir lumber and in the resultant misallocation of resources.

Indeed, an exclusive distributorship would be counterproductive so far as any monopolization goal of Doman is concerned. A monopolist manufacturer of a product restricts output of the product in order to maximize its profits. See Matsushita Elec. Zenith Radio Corp. Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law The power to restrict output to maximize profit is complete in the manufacturing monopoly, and there is no additional monopoly profit to be made by creating a monopoly in the retail distribution of the product.

See Lamoille Valley R. ICC , F. On the contrary, a firm with a monopoly at the retail distribution level will further reduce output to maximize its profits, thereby reducing the sales and profit of the monopoly manufacturer. See Cont'l T. GTE Sylvania Inc. Beverage Corp. Honickman , 55 F.

Reynolds Tobacco Co. Cigarettes Cheaper! Bluff City News Co. Like any seller of a product, a monopolist would prefer multiple competing buyers unless an exclusive distributorship arrangement provides other benefits in the way of, for example, product promotion or distribution. In fact, we have explicitly noted that "a vertically structured monopoly can take only one monopoly profit.

Beverage , 55 F. The only detriment to competition alleged to result from the Doman-Sherwood agreement is that "end-users of lumber and finished wood products have fewer options to purchase their required supplies and are now required to pay artificially inflated prices.

Thus, we have noted that "exclusive distributorship arrangements are presumptively legal. To be sure, we have never held that all exclusive arrangements are reasonable as a matter of law. In Geneva Pharmaceuticals , for example, we vacated a grant of summary judgment on a Section 1 claim that was based on an exclusive supply agreement between a drug-maker and a supplier of the active ingredient in the drug.

We acknowledged the general rule that "it usually does not further harm competition for a monopolist in one market to leverage its advantage into a monopoly in a downstream market. However, in that case there was a "window of monopoly opportunity [that] is unique. Geneva involved an allegation of two temporary, related monopolies in different products, a drug and its active ingredient.

Moreover, the two firms, which had overlapping ownership, were jointly involved in predatory practices designed to extend their respective temporary monopolies by deterring entry by competitors. The facts in Geneva , therefore, were quite different from the claim in a typical exclusive distribution case, like the present one, where it is alleged only that a monopolist manufacturer is trying to extend its monopoly into the distribution or sale of its product.

Unlike Geneva , the present case is a "run-of-the-mill exclusive distributorship controversy, where a former exclusive distributor is attempting to protect its competitive position vis a vis its supplier.

The complaint simply does not allege, therefore, "that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market. Mohawk Valley Med. Appellants' Section 2 monopolization claim fails for similar reasons. Section 2 makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations.

A viable claim under Section 2 challenging a distributorship agreement must, like a Section 1 claim, show a harm to competition. For the reasons stated above, the complaint fails to allege facts that would show that the exclusive distribution agreement between Doman and Sherwood harms competition, and it cannot be the basis of a monopolization scheme under Section 2.

Nor is the allegation that Doman reserved shipping space with the intent to exclude other manufacturers of green hem-fir lumber from that space sufficient to allege a Section 2 violation.

The reservation of space necessarily excludes, and is intended to exclude, producers of lumber of all kinds, including green hem-fir, and suppliers of all other goods for that matter, from using that same shipping space. There is no allegation that Doman did not ship lumber in the reserved space or did not do so in order to sell the lumber.

Firms do not violate the antitrust laws by meeting customers' demands even when the use of available shipping facilities may make it more difficult for competitors. Appellants also assert antitrust violations based on an alleged tying scheme.

They claim that Doman has allowed Sherwood to purchase green hem-fir lumber at a reduced price so that Sherwood can tie the sales of green hem-fir lumber to the sales of "finished wood products.

Texaco, Inc. Margaret's House Hous. Fund Corp. Appellants' complaint alleges that green hem-fir lumber is the tying product and "finished wood products" are the tied products. While green hem-fir lumber is a product with a useable definition that gives notice to the appellees of the alleged tying product, "finished wood products" is a term that covers an enormous variety of goods with an enormous number of uses.

Appellants, moreover, have not specified in the complaint, and declined to do so at oral argument, precisely which of this vast range of products appellee has tied to green hem-fir lumber. Notice pleading requires at a minimum that the pleading give the opposing party notice of the nature of the claim against it, including which of its actions gave rise to the claims upon which the complaint is based. The claim must be sufficiently particular to allow the defendant to commence discovery and prepare a defense.

See Salahuddin v. Cuomo , F. The complaint is therefore insufficient to allege a tying violation. Even under notice pleading, an antitrust defendant charged with illegal tying is entitled to some specificity as to the conduct alleged to be coercive, the customers who would have purchased a product elsewhere but for the coercion, the particular products sold as a result of the coercion, the anticompetitive effects in a specified market, and the effect on the business of the plaintiff.

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