Related videosHow Does A #Chapter 13 #Bankruptcy Case Work
All pending a meetings of creditors initially scheduled for March 25, through April 10, have been continued to a later date, most to be determined. This order may be extended. In a Chapter 13 case, the continuance of the creditor meetings does not relieve debtors of their obligation to commence making plan payments to the Trustee not later than 30 days after the date the petition was filed.
Debtors may make these payments electronically on tfs. Most jurisdictions are not doing telephonic meetings currently.
If the Trustee does conduct a telephonic meeting specific instructions will be sent. Chapter 13 confirmation hearings and hearings on miscellaneous chapter 13 matters will be held as scheduled, counsel to appear by telephone. The Trustee will not be seeking a turnover of any economic relief payments related to coronavirus. Each trustee has different rules on how they will assist debtors that have been financially impacted by COVID You must be able to provide documentation of income loss due to Covid Can suspend up to 3 payments if you can establish a loss of income or documented hardship.
Trustee drafts the stipulation if he agrees to the hardship. Payment would increase moving forward to make up for the missed payments. Judge will review after 24 day waiting period and can issue an order to suspend at that time or set the matter for hearing.
May suspend up to 3 payments and increase moving forward to make up payments. Although many mortgage lenders are offering grace periods, the bankruptcy court still expects you to make your mortgage payment.
Stay informed with updates from your court or trustee. Updated information may also be sent to you by mail, even after your meeting has taken place. Not unless your bankruptcy case has been dismissed. Debtors who file multiple bankruptcy cases in a short amount of time may be denied an automatic stay as well. All filing fees and paperwork must still be submitted on time. Deadlines for submitting course 2 certificates and other due dates still apply.
Oaktree Law has a team of members that go above and beyond the call of duty to get the job done. Having little knowledge of real estate law and being bullied by my mortgage company prior to, Oaktree Law made me feel confident and comfortable throughout the process.
Kevin M. Joseph A. Kevin R. Entries Calendar Events. Related 0. Douglass, Elizabeth. Please review the filed claim for possible error and file an amended completed proof of claim. Adversary case Attachments: 1 Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet Nature of Suit: 62 Dischargeability - a 2 , false pretenses, false representation, actual fraud , 67 Dischargeability - a 4 , fraud as fiduciary, embezzlement, larceny , 68 Dischargeability - a 6 , willful and malicious injury Associated Bankruptcy Case Number: bk Press, Daniel.
Fitzgerald, III. Guzinski, Joseph. Attachments: 1 Proposed Order Guzinski, Joseph. Robbins, Seth. Re: Doc 38 U. Notice of Appearance filed by Richard M. Sissman on behalf of Choice Stairways, Inc..
Sissman, Richard. Further, any accompanying transcript of the conversation would have to redact any statements not made by the defendant. In other words, the jury would hear only a soliloquy by the defendant, with no knowledge of the substance of any comments by others to whom the defendant was responding.
Unable to discern the context of a defendant's remarks, a jury would almost never be able to make much sense of a defendant's statements. In effect, Defendant's argument would cast doubt on a longstanding practice, occurring over decades and in innumerable trials, of permitting the jury to hear a taped conversation between a defendant and another person.
But Defendant is not right. The hearsay rule may sometimes require the exclusion of particular statements that are part of a recounted conversation, whether taped or merely recalled by the witness. But it does not operate to exclude, wholesale, remarks made by another participant to the conversation, merely because those remarks occurred outside the courtroom.
Moreover, Defendant did not even object at trial that, as a general matter, Lucienne's statements were hearsay, nor did he object to any particular statements as being hearsay. Because Defendant asserted no objections at trial on an issue that he now raises on appeal, we review this issue for plain error.
See Wetherald, F. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by a declarant while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Generally, an out-of-court statement admitted to show its effect on the hearer is not hearsay. Cruz, F. Likewise, out-of-court declarations that are "more in the nature of an order or a request" and that, "to a large degree, [are] not even capable of being true or false" are also not hearsay.
Defendant concedes that his own statements in the recordings were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence d 2 A as statements of a party-opponent. See United States v. Brown, F. Munoz, 16 F. As to Lucienne's statements, Defendant does not identify any specific statements as being hearsay, but simply contends that none of her statements should have been admitted because they were all made outside of the courtroom.
Nonetheless, we have reviewed the tape recording transcripts and conclude that almost all of Lucienne's statements fall into one of two categories, neither of which are hearsay: 1 non-assertive statements that are incapable of being true or false or 2 statements that are indisputably false. In both cases, her out-of-court declarations were offered only to show their effect on the listener: Defendant Rivera.
This is not surprising because Lucienne's entire purpose in making the tape was to prompt Defendant to talk. Her own statements, by themselves, were important only to the extent they provided a context to assess Defendant's response. Her statements therefore were not offered for the truth of the matters asserted.
The majority of Lucienne's statements are not hearsay because they are not "assertive" in nature. That is, many of her statements are, "to a large degree, not even capable of being true or false. For example, Lucienne peppered Defendant with questions throughout the four recorded conversations, asking him things such as, "And who's Felipe?
What's the problem? But the jury needed to hear them to give context to Defendant's responses, which otherwise would have been no more than a disjointed and incoherent monologue. The remainder of Lucienne's statements were not hearsay because they were indisputably false and therefore could not possibly have been offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Bowles, F. Lucienne made numerous statements to Defendant that Rodriguez was being "a man," taking the blame, and remaining silent.
But, of course, that was not true. Whether or not he was being a man, Rodriguez was certainly not remaining silent because he was already cooperating with the government. In fact, Rodriguez had testified on this point at trial, prior to the admission of these conversations. This statement too was obviously false. Lucienne had made up the existence of a recording in order to get Defendant's reaction, and hopefully an incriminating admission.
Likewise, Lucienne's statement to Defendant, "I don't work for the police," was patently false. She was voluntarily wearing a wire placed on her person by the FBI. All these statements were offered as evidence "solely for the fact that [they were] made and the effect [they] might have upon [their] hearer. Finally, we recognize that one of Lucienne's statements arguably may have constituted hearsay though, again, we note that Defendant did not object to it at trial. She told Defendant, "[My husband] said you offered him , dollars, and that if you give me the , dollars, he'll keep silent and it will all end here On April 20 you gave him 25, dollars and he recorded it Her husband and Defendant's coconspirator, Ricardo Rodriguez, had earlier testified that Defendant had offered and paid him money to have Caldera killed, and Rodriguez was subject to cross-examination by Defendant on that assertion.
Clearly, Rodriguez's testimony did not constitute hearsay. See id. Price, F. Still, if Defendant had any concerns that any of Lucienne's statements were improperly being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, he should have objected and gotten an appropriate limiting instruction.
He failed to do so. In short, where the admission of the substance of a communication between the defendant and another person is sought, the fact that the statements made by the other person were out of court does not, as a blanket matter, preclude admission.
Certainly, specific statements in the conversation may be vulnerable to a hearsay objection. But first the defendant has to identify these statements and object to their admission. That did not happen here, and our own review reveals no improper hearsay within the taped conversation that could have prejudiced Defendant. Finally, because Lucienne's statements and testimony were not hearsay, there is no need for them to fit within an exception to the rule against hearsay. Mateos, F.
Accordingly, Defendant's argument that Lucienne's taped statements were not admissible as statements of a coconspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy, under Rule d 2 E , is beside the point. In short, we find no hearsay and we find no error — plain or otherwise — in the admission of the taped conversations between Lucienne Rodriguez and Defendant.
Defendant also contends that the district court improperly admitted into evidence Lucienne's opinion testimony as to the meaning of Defendant's recorded statements. Rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits opinion testimony by lay witnesses. To qualify, a witness's opinion is limited to opinions that are " a rationally based on the witness's perception; b helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and c not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule Lay opinion testimony must be based on "firsthand knowledge or observation" and "helpful in resolving issues.
Jayyousi, F. Where a witness's testimony is based upon her "perceptions of the conversations[,] Davis, F. Additionally, a witness may clarify conversations that are "abbreviated, composed with unfinished sentences and punctuated with ambiguous references to events that [were] clear only to the [defendant] and [the witness]. Awan, F. In their briefs, the parties point to six instances where the district court overruled Defendant's recurring objection that Lucienne was offering opinion testimony.
First, during their taped May 6, , in-person meeting, in explaining how Rodriguez was caught, Lucienne started to tell Defendant that "it look[ed] like [Rodriguez] went to see somebody and he paid him the money and all that Second, in attempting to distance himself from whatever Rodriguez might have done or been accused of doing, Defendant told Lucienne, "I talked to him about Following someone, but in the investigation, not for, for something, you understand what I'm saying?
While testifying about that same conversation, Lucienne was asked what she thought was being discussed when Defendant had stated, "Hey, I'll tell you something. Defendant later told Lucienne " But he has to understand that nobody's going to talk about what he thinks you've told me and what answer can I give you? Nobody's going to tell you. At the end of their conversation, Defendant stated to Lucienne, "All right. It's going to be The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the above testimony that clarified Lucienne's understanding of the substance of her conversation with Defendant.
First, Lucienne's testimony was rationally based on her perception, firsthand knowledge, and observation. See Jayyousi, F. She was a participant in the conversations, and the statements by Defendant at issue were made directly to her. See Awan, F. Second, her testimony was helpful to the jury in understanding the facts at issue. Lucienne was clarifying a back-and-forth dialogue that contained abbreviated and unfinished sentences, with occasional unclear responses and ambiguous references to events.
For example, she was asked what vague statements meant to her, such as "to do what has to be done," "in the investigation In short, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Lucienne to clarify the conversations between herself and Defendant in the above-described instances.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, several times during cross-examination, he asked Defendant whether other witnesses who had testified contrary to Defendant on particular matters were lying. Defendant objected to most, but not all, of these kinds of questions.